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The UN has developed a diverse range of peacemaking tools, including different forms 
of political initiatives (diplomatic, technocratic, and political-development missions) 
and peacekeeping operations. Yet, we know surprisingly little about when and why we 
observe the onset of different types of UN missions. Examining an “escalatory 
trajectory,” we analyze the United Nations Peace Initiatives (UNPI) data, a new data 
set providing information on all different types of UN engagements. Our main 
contributions are that we provide insights about how the different types of missions 
relate to one another and conceptual clarity about what the different types of missions 
are. 
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The United Nations (UN) is the principal organization tasked with maintaining 
international peace and security. Over time, it has developed a diverse range of 
peacemaking tools, including political initiatives (diplomatic, technocratic, and 
political-development missions) and peacekeeping operations. Existing research has 
extensively studied the determinants of the latter, i.e., UN peacekeeping (for overviews, 
see de Jonge Oudraat, 1996; Di Salvatore & Ruggeri, 2017), reporting robustly and 
consistently that peacekeepers are deployed to so-called “hard cases.” In such conflicts, 
the level of violence and limited capabilities of the target state make it more challenging 
to resolve conflict and establish lasting peace – all of this raising the need for UN 
peacekeeping to intervene (e.g., Sambanis & Doyle, 2000). That said, a shortcoming of 
existing research is that cases where peacekeepers are not (yet) deployed are largely 
overlooked or treated as having seen no UN engagement at all. 
We contribute to this research by studying when and why different forms of UN 
peacemaking are deployed, offering one of the first analysis of political initiatives and 
peacekeeping operations jointly. Specifically, the core contribution of this research is 
two-fold, i.e., we provide insights about how the different types of missions relate to 
one another and we offer conceptual clarity about what the different types of missions 
are. En route, we answer why one form of intervention is adopted over another, and to 
what extent the presence or absence of other UN missions influences the future choice 
of operations. 1  Accordingly, we explore the conditions shaping the UN’s choice 
between political and peacekeeping missions. Scholars increasingly examine possible 
interdependencies between different conflict-management tools (Owsiak, 2014, 2015; 
 
1  Diehl & Druckman (2018) draw attention to the existence of multiple missions partaking in 
peacekeeping operations, where missions are defined by specific elements of the mandate. In contrast, 
we focus on missions that are mandated separately from peacekeeping operations and examine the 
interdependencies among such political missions as well as between them and peacekeeping operations.  
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Diehl & Regan, 2015; Melin, 2015; Owsiak, Greig & Diehl, 2021) as well as their 
complementarities (Greig & Diehl, 2005; DeRouen & Chowdhury, 2018; Beardsley, 
Cunningham & White, 2019; Kathman & Benson, 2019; Clayton & Dorussen, 2021). 
Thus, our work also adds to the empirical assessments of the interdependencies across 
UN peacemaking tools. 
 
Table 1. Categorizing UN Missions 
 
 
Political missions or initiatives generally pertain to those UN institutions and 
operations issued by mandates that focus on peace and security, but do not primarily 
involve military or police forces. 2  Table 1 summarizes the different types of UN 
peacemaking tools based on their primary purpose, area of operation, and actors involved. 
Along those criteria, we define four broad types of UN missions, which map onto the 
categories used by the UN in its budgetary process: (1) diplomatic missions, (2) 
 
2 Alternatively, Diehl & Druckman (2018) suggest using the term “mission” to describe a coherent 
category of tasks, with peace operations potentially comprising several missions.  
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technocratic missions, (3) political-development missions, and (4) peacekeeping 
operations. Diplomatic, technocratic, and political-development missions are varieties of 
(largely civilian) political initiatives in contrast to more military-oriented peacekeeping 
operations. 3  To unpack the process underlying the selection between different UN 
peacemaking tools, we undertake one of the first empirical analyses of the new UN Peace 
Initiatives (UNPI) data set (ANON), which covers all UN political initiatives and 
peacekeeping operations since 1946. 
Diplomatic missions can encompass special/personal envoys, advisers, 
representatives of the Secretary General, or mediators. Their main purpose is to assist 
belligerents with resolving incompatibilities through dialogue. For example, in 
Myanmar 2018, the UN responded to the Rakhine crisis by dispatching a diplomatic 
mission in the form of a special envoy mandated to provide good offices and promote 
a more inclusive peace process. Technocratic missions comprise groups, committees, 
and commissions of technical experts who advise or support peacemaking activities, 
i.e., sanctions-monitoring teams, committees, or expert panels. The Panel of Experts on 
Iran was an independent expert body that investigated the Iranian nuclear program. This 
mission, based in the UN headquarters in New York and comprising eight experts from 
different member states, supported UN decision-making by providing information and 
advice to the Security Council. Political-development missions are in-country 
operations that support, strengthen, and develop the political and/or governance 
capabilities of a state. These can be small civilian missions (e.g., Burundi or Haiti) or 
multidimensional state-building projects such as in Afghanistan. The UN Assistance 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) is another example of a large, costly, and more 
 
3 We recognize that the UN may further deploy a wide array of missions with a humanitarian and/or 
health mandate to conflict affected areas. Here, we consider only missions with an explicit peace-and-
security mandate. 
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interventionist political-development mission that has been mandated since 2003 to 
inter alia advance inclusive political dialogue, assist in the electoral process, protect 
human rights, and promote gender equality. Finally, in contrast to these predominantly 
civilian political missions, peacekeeping operations are more military in nature, seeking 
to observe or physically manage the interactions between armed forces. 
What are the systematic drivers behind the choice for a particular mission? We 
advance the key proposition that political and peacekeeping engagements are linked to 
different costs of intervention and that, following the requirements on the ground, the 
UN and hosting states aim at minimizing these costs. Comparing peacekeeping 
operations with political missions, we find that the latter are more likely to be 
implemented when conflict has not (yet) escalated and longer peace durations have 
passed since the last hostilities. States with a history of conflict are also more likely to 
initially host a political mission. Further, the UN commonly fields multiple missions in 
a sequence of interventions. Consider, for example, Timor Leste where a diplomatic 
mission preceded a peacekeeping mission.4 Accordingly, we also examine how the 
deployment of missions is shaped by the existence of other UN missions. Recognizing 
the variation in costs of deploying different missions, we argue that there is an 
underlying “escalatory” logic to subsequent mission onsets. Once a particular type of 
peacemaking tool is deployed, the UN is more inclined to escalate to a costlier mission 
if fighting continues.5    
In the next section, we identify three factors that have previously been shown to 
influence the onset of UN missions: the authorization process, funding and personnel 
 
4 In fact, the UN established the Peacebuilding Commission in 2005, mandated to “propose integrated 
strategies for post-conflict peacebuilding and recovery,” to address the challenges associated with 
integrating different missions. 
5 To the best of our knowledge, Heldt (2013) is the only other study to explicitly consider the sequencing 
of UN peacemaking efforts. Owsiak (2014; 2015) and Melin (2015) examine the sequencing of various 
conflict management tools in interstate conflicts. 
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supply, and belligerent consent. We then focus individually on each of the three factors 
and demonstrate the differences between political missions and peacekeeping. These 
differences, we contend, produce an escalatory trajectory where a greater threat to the 
international community is required to activate more significant and costly UN 
missions. In turn, we focus on the transition between missions, and set out how the 
escalatory logic also shapes subsequent mission deployment. 
 
The Conditions of UN Political Interventions 
As the leading global international organization, UN crisis intervention is generally 
considered a legitimate response of the international community. To manage conflict, 
the UN can rely on its diplomatic and technical expertise and, if necessary, has access 
to notable military and economic resources. Much existing research focuses on the most 
militarized UN peacemaking response: peacekeeping operations (see de Jonge Oudraat, 
1996; Di Salvatore & Ruggeri, 2017). The UN deployed more than 100,000 (military) 
peacekeepers in 2019, the missions are contentious political topics, and they clearly 
affect the conflict space (see Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2014; Freedman, 2018).  
Beyond peacekeeping, there is also prominent research on the UN’s diplomatic 
activities and its role as a mediator (e.g., Svensson, 2009; Beardsley & Schmidt, 2012; 
Beardsley, Cunningham & White, 2019). These works, however, largely overlook the 
wider array of diplomatic engagements, such as special representatives of the Secretary 
General who frequently perform important peacemaking functions beyond “mediation 
only.” A similar kind of neglect applies to technocratic and political-development 
missions, despite the frequency with which they occur. While we have gained a better 
understanding of the processes determining the choice of conflict managements tools 
(e.g., Melin, 2015) and the conditions under which certain tools are more likely to occur 
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(e.g., Greig & Regan, 2008; Melin & Svensson, 2009), our knowledge of when and 
why the UN adopt which peacemaking tool remains limited.  
 
Table 2. Assessing the Costs of UN Missions 
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Existing research points to the importance of costs as a determinant of conflict 
management tools. In this context, for example, mediation (e.g., Melin & Svensson, 
2009; Clayton, 2013) and peacekeeping (e.g., Fortna, 2004; Ruggeri, Dorussen & 
Gizelis, 2017) both tend to occur in the more challenging contexts: the relevant parties 
are more willing to bear the costs associated with such peacemaking instruments when 
the costs of continued conflict are higher. Examining four different types of UN 
engagements, it is thus crucial to rank such conflict management tools in terms of their 
cost. Frazier & Dixon (2006: 395) define verbal expressions, diplomatic approaches, 
legal/judicial processes, civil/administrative assistance, and military involvement as 
overall categories of third-party conflict management. They also identify specific 
strategies or tasks within each category. Good offices, mediation, and conciliation are 
seen as least costly diplomatic approaches. Diplomatic approaches further include 
inquiries and fact-finding, while specific strategies of legal processes comprise 
arbitration, judicial settlements, and tribunals. Alongside sanctions, these strategies are 
key elements of what we define as technocratic missions.  
Owsiak (2014: 54) identifies their costs as low to medium, while Melin (2015: 31) 
considers them an escalation from verbal expressions. According to Frazier & Dixon 
(2006), the provision of civil administration and assistance encompasses tasks such 
boundary demarcation, temporary administration, humanitarian assistance, election 
monitoring, temporary administration, disarmament inspection, and repatriation. These 
tasks are the focus of political-development missions and also covered by peacekeeping 
operations. Owsiak (2014: 54) classifies them as more costly, and Melin (2015, 31) 
treats them as an escalation from diplomatic approaches. Finally, military involvement 
includes specific strategies ranging from military observation, preventive and inter-
positionary peacekeeping to demobilization and humanitarian protection. In line with 
 9 
our arguments, peacekeeping operations are considered as most costly (Owsiak 2014: 
54) and as the highest level of escalation (Melin 2015: 31).6 Building on this work, and 
the UN’s own guidance, we set out an argument for why the choice of UN peacemaking 
is shaped by the costs associated with the different missions. Table 2 summarizes what 
we contend and compares our ranking to other studies. We eventually identify three 
key factors that shape the costs and, thus, the selection of UN missions: authorization, 
funding and supply, and belligerent consent for UN missions. 
Authorization: Following Art. 99 of the UN Charter, the Secretary General can 
“bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his or her opinion 
may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security.” Good offices and 
mediation have been established under Art. 99 by various UN Secretary Generals and 
apply to missions created directly by the Secretary General (as well as those mandated 
by the Security Council) (Kugel, 2011: 2). The UN Secretariat can deploy and authorize 
technical missions to analyze and assess the security, political, military, humanitarian, 
and human rights situation (United Nations, 2020) without an explicit vote of the 
Security Council. The General Assembly mandates political missions7 and occasionally 
authorizes subsidiary organs with a peace and stability mandate by majority vote, e.g., 
the Special Committee on Decolonization. 8  In contrast, the authorization of 
peacekeeping missions requires a resolution of the Security Council and, thus, in 
practice avoiding a veto by one of the permanent members. While political missions 
 
6  Diehl, Reifschneider & Hensel (1996), and Beardsley & Schmidt (2012) suggest alternative 
classifications that are largely compatible in ranking of costliness and escalation. 
7  The Report of the Secretary General on Political Missions (2013) lists four General-Assembly 
mandated missions: the Special Adviser on Myanmar, the Office of the Joint Special Representative of 
the UN and the League of Arab States for Syria, the UN Office to the African Union, and the Office of 
the UN Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process. 
8 As illustrated by this committee, individual members can still block the inclusion of specific territories 
on the UN list of non-self-governing entities. Our research is limited to missions approved by the Security 
Council. 
 10 
can be relatively easily authorized for a range of issues, the threat must be sufficiently 
high to galvanize and unite the permanent members of the Security Council without 
impinging on their core interests for peacekeeping to be implemented. 
Funding and Supply: Political missions are comparatively small and inexpensive 
(UN Department of Political Affairs, 2017: 6). Field missions have generally fewer than 
500 staff members, while fewer than 50 people commonly support a special envoy. 
Hence, deploying additional political missions, even when they are relatively large, 
field-based operations, is less of a burden on UN staff and budget than peacekeeping 
operations. In contrast, peacekeeping missions are costly to deploy and they take up a 
significant part of the UN funds. Whereas the burden of traditional peacekeeping 
missions remains manageable, transformational interventions9 impose a considerable 
strain on the UN. For example, MINUSMA in Mali, UNMISS in South Sudan, or 
MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo deploy up to 20,000 personnel 
and have an annual budget of more than $1 billion each. In general, the UN spent 
approximately $6.5 billion to deploy almost 100,000 peacekeepers to 13 missions in 
07/2019-06/2020. 
Peacekeeping comes with considerable risks in executing a mandate (Duursma, 
2019). Since 1948, there have been almost 4,000 fatalities in peacekeeping operations 
(Salverda, 2013; Fjelde, Hultman & Lindberg Bromley, 2016; Bromley, 2018). 
Peacekeeping ineffectiveness, e.g., the failure of peacekeepers to protect civilians, can 
lead to notable political and reputational damage. The same is increasingly true for 
(sexual) misconduct by individual peacekeepers (Karim & Beardsley, 2017; Freedman, 
2018). While political missions share some of these risks when based in the field, their 
 
9 Transformation missions refer to “second-generation operations” that address the conflict issues and 
“third generation” enforcement operations that do not require the consent of the conflict parties (Hegre, 
Hultman & Nygård, 2018). 
 11 
political (rather than military) character and deployment away from the battlefronts 
significantly lower these. In sum, the initiation of political missions likely requires a 
significantly lower financial and material investment on the part of the UN and its 
member states, while carrying a lower risk than peacekeeping missions.  
Consent: Political missions more clearly respect the autonomy of parties involved, 
in particular the sovereignty of the incumbent government. Political envoys and good 
offices depend on the willingness of the parties to engage in the peace process, but even 
sanction committees ultimately rely on actors’ willingness to comply with inspections. 
Political missions never compel a belligerent to alter their behavior under the threat of 
force. Legally and practically, consent is not a fixed entity, meaning it can be withdrawn 
over time (Piccolino & Karlsrud, 2011; Tull, 2013).  As a result, the political costs of 
hosting a political mission are lower for hosting countries. Gaining consent for a 
peacekeeping mission is a more challenging task. Having to accept an external force is 
a serious constraint on state sovereignty. Except for Chapter VII missions, 
peacekeeping depends on the consent of the warring parties. 10  Once deployed, 
peacekeeping tends to limit the ability of the (former) belligerents to withdraw their 
consent (Piccolino & Karlsrud, 2011; Tull, 2013).11 
Ultimately, considering the arguments for authorization, funding and supply, and 
consent, political initiatives are less costly for the UN than peacekeeping operations. 
Countries should find it easier to finance and staff political missions, while potential 
hosts are likely to be more willing to accept them. It follows that political initiatives are 
the preferred instrument when the UN perceives a threat to international peace and 
stability, but not sufficiently high enough to trigger action from the Security Council. 
 
10 In fact, Chapter VII missions often have the consent of at least some of the warring parties as well.  
11 For example, UNMOGIP remains deployed on the India–Pakistan border even after India argued that 
its mandate had lapsed in 1972. 
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In contrast, it may be more challenging to authorize peacekeeping due to higher costs 
and invasiveness. Hence, the Security Council is likely to deploy peacekeeping rather 
than a political mission only when a dispute poses a threat to international peace and 
security that outweighs the costs associated with a mission. From this discussion we 
derive the first hypothesis:  
 
Hypothesis 1: Political missions are more likely to emerge than peacekeeping 
operations when there is a lower threat to the international community.  
 
Escalation across UN interventions 
In any conflict, information about the capabilities, resolve, and intentions of the fighting 
parties is often sparse especially at the start of a dispute. Earlier diplomatic 
interventions can reveal information that call for a reassessment of the approach. The 
situation on the ground may also simply change over time. Thus, rather than focusing 
only on the initial choice and onset of mission, we also have to consider how earlier 
missions impact later mission deployments – potentially of a different type than before.  
A growing body of literature focuses on what Owsiak (2014; 2015) terms conflict 
management trajectories, i.e., the sequencing of third-party interventions. Over the 
course of a dispute, there are multiple interventions with different techniques. 
Moreover, subsequent efforts by the same, or different, peacemaker are clearly not 
independent from prior ones (see also Böhmelt, 2014; Corbetta, 2015; Diehl & Regan, 
2015; Aduda, 2019). The level of initial interventions signals the willingness or resolve 
of the peacemaker, while subsequent, more costly interventions respond to experiences 
with earlier interventions (Owsiak 2014: 66). Melin (2011; 2015) also observers that 
the selection and escalation of third-party intervention strategies reflects the failures 
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and successes of earlier interventions. Escalation across interventions results from a 
commitment to conflict management. Until now though, the literature mainly focuses 
on conflict management trajectories in the context of militarized interstate disputes 
(MIDs). We argue that a similar escalatory logic underpins subsequent UN 
peacemaking tools, where increasingly costly methods become more likely over the 
course of continued UN involvement. This rationale suggests escalation to higher-cost 
missions or initiatives following an initial, less costly, intervention. 
Political missions likely carry fewer costs than peacekeeping with regard to 
authorization, funding and supply, and belligerent consent. Given a first engagement, 
if conflict continues, the UN has to decide whether to sustain its efforts (continuing the 
mission), to scale them back, or to increase them by implementing a more costly 
initiative. The decision to increase efforts constitutes escalation (Zartman & Faure, 
2005: 7). The escalatory rationale is that, as involvement progresses, the UN will either 
sustain or escalate engagement. We contend that when faced with a challenge, the UN 
is most likely to escalate to a (more costly) higher-effort mission. As long as a dispute 
poses a threat to international peace and stability, actors will continue to rely on the 
UN. Sustained UN involvement and commitment of conflict management facilitates 
escalation.12 
Diplomatic and technocratic missions are often required to agree to a framework for 
further meaningful intervention (United Nations, 2020). Mediation is the primary tool 
of a diplomatic mission for identifying possible solutions to a conflict and for helping 
parties to overcome issues of commitment and information asymmetries (Fearon, 
1995). Technocratic missions provide technical information, which can help determine 
 
12 Beardsley & Schmidt (2012: 39) formulate the related hypothesis that the greater the threat an 
international crisis poses to international stability, the higher the level of UN involvement. However, this 
expectation pertains to the highest level of UN involvement rather than escalation across different 
initiatives. We contend that greater threat leads to escalation because of sustained UN involvement. 
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the size and scope of subsequent initiatives (United Nations, 2020). Diplomatic 
missions may allow parties to identify a self-sustaining peace, but a peace agreement 
could well be only feasible with the deployment peacekeeping missions (Beardsley, 
2011).  
Peacekeeping and political-development missions allow the UN to have an impact 
on the situation on the ground more directly. This is particularly relevant when the 
legacy of conflict requires more direct involvement, e.g., when the UN is tasked to 
implement demobilization and security sector reform. Peacekeeping and political-
development missions can enhance the credibility of commitments made by the warring 
parties (Walter, 2001) when an agreement is fragile. Combining the “escalatory logic” 
with the ordering of effort for different types of UN mission, i.e., diplomatic missions 
as the least costly initiatives, followed by technocratic, development, and peacekeeping 
interventions (in that order), suggests that subsequent UN interventions are more likely 
to escalate from political missions to peacekeeping operations:   
 
Hypothesis 2: Over the course of a conflict, the UN is likely to escalate with subsequent 
interventions from lower-cost to higher-cost missions. 
 
Research Design 
Dependent Variables and Methodology 
We rely on the UN Peace Initiatives (UNPI) data set (ANON). The UNPI defines a 
peacemaking initiative as any subsidiary organ, temporary or permanent, created by the 
UN under a peace and security mandate, to address, prevent, manage, or resolve 
conflict. It covers all UN Missions in 1946-2015 and includes information on the onset 
and termination of missions, the mandated functions, and actors involved. To the best 
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of our knowledge, the UNPI is the first data set covering the full range of UN 
peacemaking activities, which also facilitates the analysis of selection and sequencing 
of peace missions. In particular, the inclusion of political missions is a notable extension 
on the growing number of peacekeeping data sets that are limited to the more 
militarized forms of intervention (see Clayton et al., 2017; Bara & Hultman, 2020). 
Similarly, the data extend previous collections that only capture UN mediation episodes 
(e.g., DeRouen, Bercovitch & Pospieszna, 2011). And unlike event-based conflict 
management data (e.g., Melander & von Uexkull, 2011), the UNPI contains 
information on bodies and organs that may undertake multiple events and exist for 
longer periods.  
 The mission is the unit of analysis for the analysis pertaining to first hypothesis (H1) 
and we only focus on the onset of new or “first” initiatives. Follow-up missions or those 
that are merely renewed are initially omitted due to persistent cross-unit (path) 
dependencies. This setup has several advantages in that we can focus on missions as 
such, while avoiding potential case linkages biasing our estimates. At first, we thus 
exclude no-mission cases, i.e., years, conflicts, or countries in which a mission could 
have been established, but never materialized. We include all missions regardless of 
whether a conflict is ongoing.13  
For the analysis pertaining to the second hypothesis (H2), we concentrate on those 
interventions that are tied to a conflict as defined according to the Uppsala Data 
Program (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Linking missions to conflicts is crucial for identifying 
their sequence – the core of this part of the empirics. That is, while UN political 
missions can occur without actual fighting taking place, it is difficult to identify whether 
 
13 Since political missions frequently are established outside of active conflicts or may not be tied to 
escalated, observable disputes, we refrain from starting with conflict as the unit of analysis. We consider 
the inclusion of no-conflict/no-intervention country-years below, though, to address selection problems. 
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a mission is a follow-up to another one under those circumstances, making it even more 
challenging to code any real sequence of interventions. Focusing on conflict 
environments circumvents this issue, albeit at the expense of several non-conflict cases 
(N=184) being omitted from our second analysis. We initially also omit no-mission 
cases, but we consider the inclusion of no-interventions after discussing the main results 
for our first hypothesis. 
For the first analysis, there are 462 unique new or first political missions, while we 
capture 414 political missions, some of which are follow-up missions to previous ones, 
for the second analysis. The dependent variable for testing H1 is nominally scaled and 
distinguishes between different missions: 82 are peacekeeping operations, 89 are 
political-development interventions, 62 are of a diplomatic nature, and 229 are 
technocratic missions. As a result, our first analyses are based on multinomial logit 
regression models.14 Here, we begin by considering all missions using peacekeeping 
operations as the baseline category, which allows us to identify any systematic 
differences between peacekeeping operations and political missions. In turn, we omit 
the peacekeeping category and estimate a series of models that focus on diplomatic 
missions, technocratic missions, and political-development interventions only (with 
varying baseline categories for reference).  
For the analysis of H2, the final data comprise 139 peacekeeping operations, 104 
political-development interventions, 41 diplomatic initiatives, and 130 technocratic 
missions. We have created two different dependent variables. First, there is a first-
difference measure, which captures the escalatory logic. That is, assuming that 
diplomatic, technocratic, political-development, and peacekeeping missions follow an 
 
14 These models rest on a series of assumptions, including the independence of irrelevant alternatives. 
We test these in the appendix, where we also discuss alternative specifications of our models. 
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escalatory trajectory, the first dependent variable captures whether a follow-up mission 
is, in comparison to the preceding mission, more (1) or less costly (-1), or at the same 
level (0). A mission is coded at the same level (i.e., 0) when a new mission of the same 
type is formed, or if the mission is given a new mandate (i.e., UNAVEM I to UNAVEM 
II). Recall that diplomatic missions are the least costly initiatives, followed by 
technocratic, development, and peacekeeping interventions (in that order). In light of 
this dependent variable, we use ordered logistic regression models. Second, we created 
a nominally scaled variable that simply distinguishes between mission types and, thus, 
use again multinomial logit regression.  
 
Explanatory Variables – Hypothesis 1 
We focus on three main explanatory variables: the link to an active conflict, the duration 
of peace since the last conflict, and a country’s war history. First, as indicated above, 
missions may, but do not have to be established during active conflicts. In several 
instances, missions are created for cases short of actual or intense clashes. Arguably, 
however, cases will be more complex to solve and more protracted, once they have 
escalated to real fighting. To this end, we created Conflict Link, which captures in a 
binary fashion whether a specific mission was linked to a conflict as identified by the 
Uppsala Data Program (Gleditsch et al., 2002). 
Second, cases with longer peace durations tend to be the more settled ones, where 
grievances that may have led to the original outbreak of a dispute have been more fully 
addressed. Hence, longer peace durations should stand for the “easier” cases. We 
measure this with a variable counting the number of years elapsed since the last conflict. 
As before, conflict is defined by the Uppsala Data Program (Gleditsch et al., 2002). If 
a country has never seen any conflict, our peace-year counter starts in 1946. 
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Finally, next to an active-conflict link and peace durations, the war history of a 
country may signal whether a case is an easier or difficult one. Using the Uppsala data 
again (Gleditsch et al., 2002), we created an item on the number of conflict onsets a 
state has previously seen and turned this into a binary variable receiving a value of 1 if 
at least one war broke out in the past (and 0 otherwise). We opted for a dichotomous 
measure to ease interpretation. All else equal, countries with a war in the past will be 
part of the more difficult cases. The underlying rationale is, however, different from 
active conflicts in the present or the duration of peace since the last conflict. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for H1 Analysis 
  Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
UN Mission 462 2.413 0.932 1 4 
Conflict Link 467 0.685 0.465 0 1 
Peace Duration 356 7.514 14.507 0 69 
War Dummy 356 0.702 0.458 0 1 
GDP per capita (ln) 291 6.886 1.681 3.707 11.191 
Population (ln) 380 15.735 1.864 8.946 20.155 
Democracy 346 1.298 6.298 -10 10 
Peacekeeping Count 467 10.805 6.561 0 20 
 
As control variables, we consider standard covariates used in the study of conflict 
and peacekeeping. In our case, these variables either capture alternative mechanisms 
leading to the establishment of a specific mission type or correlate with our main 
explanatory variables. We eventually include four such items. First, there is GDP per 
capita. Income is one of the most robust determinants of conflict outbreaks in that 
wealthier states are less likely to see conflict emerging (e.g. Ward, Greenhill & Bakke, 
2010). Subscribing to this pattern, wealthier states belong to the easier cases. The data 
are taken from the World Bank (2018). Second, we include the natural logarithm of 
population. We again draw on data by the World Bank (2018). Theoretically, more 
populous states are potentially more heterogeneous in ethnicity, interests, actors, etc., 
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and thus constitute more difficult cases (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). Third, we expect that 
regime type matters – not only for conflict outbreak and dynamics, but also for mission 
allocations. Using data from the Polity IV Project (Marshall & Jaggers, 2002), we 
employ the polity2, in which higher values represent more democratic countries. 
Finally, we include the count of the number of peacekeeping operations in a given year. 
The variable is based on information from the UN (2019) and ranges between 0 and 20. 
In essence, the additional costs of setting up another peacekeeping mission should be 
lower the more missions the UN currently has running.  
We control for temporal dependencies in the current setup via standard approaches 
in categorical dependent variable models (Beck, Katz, and Tucker, 1998): the peace 
duration variable, although also a substantively important predictor, is the crucial 
variable here. 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics for H2 Analysis 
  Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
UN Mission First Difference 358 -0.003 0.692 -1 1 
UN Mission Nominal 414 2.824 1.009 1 4 
Diplomatict-1 358 0.087 0.282 0 1 
Technocratict-1 358 0.330 0.471 0 1 
Political-Developmentt-1 358 0.237 0.426 0 1 
Peacekeepingt-1 358 0.346 0.476 0 1 
Peace Duration 368 3.484 8.891 0 62 
War Dummy 368 0.902 0.297 0 1 
GDP per capita (ln) 300 6.568 1.304 4.175 10.950 
Population (ln) 366 16.037 1.309 13.368 20.721 
Democracy 338 1.982 5.106 -10 10 
Peacekeeping Count 414 13.198 6.001 0 20 
 
 
Explanatory Variables – Hypothesis 2 
Our main explanatory variables for the second analysis are based on the mission data, 
but we focus on the type of mission employed prior to the intervention under 
consideration. That is, using three dichotomous variables, we distinguish between 
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diplomatic, technocratic, and political-development missions (using peacekeeping as 
the reference category) and employ these as determinants of either moving on the 
escalation trajectory in the next round (order logistic regression model) or the specific 
mission type being initiated in the next step of a sequence (multinomial logit model). 
The controls we include here are the same as used for the first set of models (for H1). 
 
Table 5. The Determinants of UN Missions – Main Model 
 
 Diplomatic Technocratic Political-Development 
Conflict Link -2.120** -3.481*** -2.782*** 
 (1.023) (0.939) (1.056) 
Peace Duration 0.059** 0.032 0.039* 
 (0.026) (0.023) (0.022) 
War Dummy 1.552* 0.769 1.099* 
 (0.904) (0.617) (0.636) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.097 -0.033 -0.219 
 (0.186) (0.190) (0.197) 
Population (ln) 0.345 0.004 -0.401 
 (0.220) (0.213) (0.216) 
Democracy 0.053 0.043 0.083* 
 (0.047) (0.042) (0.047) 
Peacekeeping Count -0.112** -0.123** -0.048 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) 
Constant -4.873 4.538 9.846*** 
 (3.438) (2.868) (3.463) 
Obs.   248 
Log Pseudolikelihood   -282.348 
Wald χ2   122.72 
Prob > χ2   0.000 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping 




Table 5 summarizes our main model for testing H1. We use peacekeeping operations 
as the reference category and, thus, compare all three types of political missions with 
these. The coefficients in Table 5 can be interpreted along the direction of their impact 
and statistical significance. The substantive quantities of interest are presented in 
Figures 1-2, which depict changes in the probability of scoring a certain outcome. 
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Importantly, the key aspect is whether the confidence intervals overlap across outcome 
categories or not. 
 



















Notes:  Point estimates are first differences in the probability of seeing a specific mission when changing 
a variable (vertical axis) from its 5th to its 95th percentile (or 0 to 1 for binary variables) while holding all 
other variables constant at their median; dashed lines stand for 95 percent confidence intervals; per 
variable (Conflict Link, Peace Duration, or War Dummy), we show the estimates per outcome category 
of our dependent variables (i.e., diplomatic mission, technocratic mission, political-development 
mission, and peacekeeping).  
 
We obtain evidence that political missions differ from UN peacekeeping 
interventions in important aspects. First, a link to an active conflict generally lowers 
the likelihood to see diplomatic, technocratic, or political-development missions. The 
coefficient estimate of Conflict Link is consistently negatively signed in Table 5 and 
significant at conventional levels. In more substantive terms, Figure 1 plots the changes 
in the predicted probability of seeing a specific outcome value when altering Conflict 
Link. Our estimate for peacekeeping statistically differs from the political missions. In 
fact, an active conflict increases the likelihood of a peacekeeping mission by almost 30 
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percentage points. For diplomatic and political-development missions, the estimates are 
insignificant, but they differ from peacekeeping operations (as shown in Table 5 as 
well). Finally, a conflict link even decreases the probability of observing a technocratic 
mission in absolute terms by about 32 percentage points; this estimate also differs from 
the observed first difference for peacekeeping. 
Second, the longer peace lasted since the last conflict, the less likely peacekeeping 
operations become. The item Peace Duration is positively signed for all categories of 
our outcome variable in comparison to peacekeeping in Table 5, suggesting that 
political missions are, all else equal, more likely to emerge than peacekeeping 
operations the more time elapsed since the last fighting. The coefficient estimate is not 
statistically different from technocratic and peacekeeping missions, however. The 
substantive quantities of interest (Figure 1) underline this: increasing Peace Duration 
from its 5th to its 95th percentile lowers the chances of peacekeeping onset by about 25 
percentage points. The estimates for political-development and technocratic missions 
are indistinguishable from 0, but the former’s confidence interval does not overlap with 
the one for peacekeeping missions. In terms of diplomatic missions, their likelihood 
increases by about 26 percentage points when changing Peace Duration from its 5th to 
its 95th percentile.  
Third, a general history of war decreases the likelihood of peacekeeping missions in 
comparison to the political missions. As shown in Figure 1, the chances of 
peacekeeping are lower by 22 percentage points compared to a country without any 
conflict before. The point estimates for seeing any of the political missions are higher, 
while their confidence intervals do not overlap with the one of peacekeeping. Having 
said that, all political missions’ estimates do not significantly differ from 0. This finding 
is contrary to our expectations where we deemed countries with a history of conflict to 
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be “harder” cases. Possibly, however, a country without any prior war history that 
suddenly sees the outbreak of a conflict may well be classified as a more difficult case, 
rendering peacekeeping operations the more suitable choice. Other forms of 
intervention, such as political missions, then have – in comparison – a higher chance of 
being implemented when there is a history of conflict. Admittedly, this is an ad-hoc 
explanation and, in absolute terms, the effect is negligible as the probability point 
estimates do not differ from 0. 
 














Conflict Link -1.328** -0.606 0.723 
 (0.619) (0.659) (0.611) 
Peace Duration -0.032 -0.030 0.003 
 (0.025) (0.023) (0.015) 
War Dummy -0.931 -0.789 0.142 
 (0.963) (0.935) (0.523) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.078 -0.227 -0.149 
 (0.139) (0.159) (0.152) 
Population (ln) -0.365*** -0.766*** -0.401** 
 (0.142) (0.187) (0.170) 
Democracy -0.013 0.023 0.037 
 (0.036) (0.037) (0.043) 
Peacekeeping Count -0.000 0.084* 0.084** 
 (0.052) (0.050) (0.042) 
Constant -9.436*** 14.470*** 5.034 
 (2.649) (3.644) (3.175) 
Obs.  193 193 
Log Pseudolikelihood  -174.448 -174.448 
Wald χ2  59.35 59.35 
Prob > χ2  0.000 0.000 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping 
mission is baseline category; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
We also examined the differences among political missions when excluding 
peacekeeping as an alternative. We thus re-estimate Table 5, while excluding 
peacekeeping missions and altering the reference category. Table 6 summarizes our 
results. The only key difference is given for technocratic vs. diplomatic missions and 
for Conflict Link: an active conflict lowers the chances of a technocratic mission in 
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comparison to a diplomatic initiative. The results for Peace Duration and War Dummy 
are inconclusive, though, suggesting that the main “cleavage” seems to be between 
peacekeeping and political missions. Within the category of the latter, minor differences 
do exist, but our main determinants do not identify much of a systematic difference 
among them in general. In other words, diplomatic, technocratic, and political-
development missions seem much alike, but they significantly differ from 
peacekeeping interventions as such.  
 
Figure 2. Control Variables’ First Difference Estimates 
 
Notes: Point estimates are first differences in the probability of seeing a specific mission when changing 
a variable (vertical axis) from its 5th to its 95th percentile (or 0 to 1 for binary variables) while holding all 
other variables constant at their median; dashed lines stand for 95 percent confidence intervals; per 
variable, we show the estimates per outcome category of our dependent variables (i.e., diplomatic 
mission, technocratic mission, political-development mission, and peacekeeping).  
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Interesting differences among the political missions emerge in light of our control 
variables. While these, except for Peacekeeping Count, cannot explain much of the 
difference to the establishment of peacekeeping operations (Table 5), they allow us to 
get a more fine-grained understanding of when a particular type of political mission is 
created. In particular, more populous countries are more likely to attract diplomatic 
missions. Technocratic missions are also more likely than political-development 
missions in larger states. The first difference calculations in Figure 2 also mirror this. 
Finally, coming back to Peacekeeping Count, it seems that the more active 
peacekeeping operations in a given year, the less difficult it is to create yet another such 
mission, making it more likely that a peacekeeping operation is established compared 
to all the other available choices. 
So far, we focused on interventions as such due to parsimony and to facilitate 
interpretation. However, omitting non-conflict and non-intervention cases can still 
induce bias. In the following, we seek to assess this bias and, if necessary, correct for 
it. First, as political missions can be sent to countries without an active conflict along 
the lines of the Uppsala Data Program (Gleditsch et al., 2002), simply adding conflict 
country-years without UN intervention is likely to be incomplete. Instead, our starting 
point for considering non-intervention cases is a monadic, country-year data set we 
created using the Uppsala Data Program (Gleditsch et al., 2002). For this data set, we 
specify with a dichotomous variable whether armed conflict was present in a country-
year or not. In turn, we merged in the information for the political missions and replaced 
any missing information there by 0s. Effectively, we thus consider political missions 
and peacekeeping missions next to non-interventions. In a third step, using the same 
data sources as described in the main text, we merged in the control variables. 
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With that data material at hand, we seek to estimate a two-stage process: initially, 
whether the UN considers any intervention at all as opposed to do nothing; and, 
afterwards if an intervention is the chosen option, we want to model which of the 
possible options is likely to be the most preferred one. To this end, we have opted for 
the “classical” Heckman (1979) Selection Model, in which the estimated mean function 
in the outcome stage is conditioned on the first stage selection process and, thereby, 
provides a consistent estimate for the truncated distribution of the second stage sample. 
It consists of a selection equation: 
𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖∗ =  𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 𝛾𝛾 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 
where  𝑠𝑠*= �1 if 𝑠𝑠* > 00 if 𝑠𝑠* ≤ 0 
and an outcome equation:  
𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 = {𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖 if 𝑠𝑠* > 0 
The correlation of the error terms in the two stages, ρ, and its significance can be 
interpreted in line of how important selection in the particular context really is. Its 
estimation, however, can be highly sensitive to model specifications. In practice, the 
Heckman Selection Model is commonly implemented as a two-step model, in which 
step one consists of estimating a probit model for the selection equation. The second 
step involves estimating a corrected version of the outcome equation using OLS. 
Important for the identification of the Heckman model is that at least one variable 
should be found that influences only the selection into the sample but not the outcome 
of interest. 
Despite a strictly speaking nominally-scaled outcome variable, we believe the 
Heckman model with its corrected OLS-based second stage can be applied for two 
reasons. On one hand, theoretically, we do contend for an escalatory logic surrounding 
UN missions, and the OLS setup imposes the corresponding hierarchy in missions. On 
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the other hand, we have shown above that OLS regression using mission-data only 
produces results that are qualitatively similar to the multinomial regression in the main 
text. The model in Table 7 considers some of the controls only for the selection stage 
and also include variables for temporal correction in this equation (Carter & Signorino, 
2010).  
 
Table 7. Heckman Selection Model 
 
 OLS Probit Selection 
Conflict Link       2.496***      8.684*** 
 (0.345) (0.633) 
Peace Duration   -0.013*       0.012*** 
 (0.007) (0.004) 
War Dummy -0.267 0.080 
 (0.286) (0.190) 
GDP per capita (ln)     0.080** 
  (0.039) 
Population (ln)      0.116** 
  (0.047) 
Democracy  0.008 
  (0.009) 
Peacekeeping Count     0.035** 0.004 
 (0.017) (0.012) 
Intervention Years  -0.013 
  (0.019) 
Intervention Years2  0.000 
  (0.001) 
Intervention Years3  -0.000 
  (0.000) 
Obs.  5,936 
Log Pseudolikelihood / RMSE  -379.121 
ρ  26.090*** 
Wald χ2 / F  115.08 
Prob > χ2 / F  0.000 
 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; constants 
included in both stages, but omitted from presentation. 
 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 7 summarizes the Heckman results. Several interesting findings emerge. First, 
selection likely is an issue. The ρ coefficient is positively signed and significant, which 
highlights that UN interventions are not randomly allocated to country-years and, more 
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specifically that unobserved influences increasing the changes for intervention in 
general also increase the likelihood of seeing more “escalated,” i.e., enforcing and 
costly missions. Second, but even when controlling for sample selection and 
considering non-intervention cases in our data, the outcome stage of the Heckman 
model presents results that are nearly identical to the ones presented above. A conflict 
association makes it more likely to see more enforcing missions, including 
peacekeeping operations; but the more time elapsed since the last dispute, the more 
likely it is to see less enforcing missions such as diplomatic, technocratic, and 
development interventions. 
 
Table 8. The Escalatory Logic of UN Missions 
 







Peace Duration -0.115 
 (0.030) 
War Dummy 0.046 
 (1.116) 
GDP per capita (ln) -0.057 
 (0.140) 




Peacekeeping Count 0.158*** 
 (0.055) 
Obs. 229 
Log Pseudolikelihood -181.916 
Wald χ2 72.68 
Prob > χ2 0.000 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Table 8 summarizes the empirical results of our ordered logistic regression model 
(H2). We use peacekeeping operations as the reference category and, thus, the effects 
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of all three political missions on the first-difference outcome variable must be 
interpreted with reference to peacekeeping interventions.15 We obtain strong evidence 
for an escalatory logic. The coefficient estimates of all political-mission dummies are 
positively signed and statistically significant. This suggests that all of these political 
missions, in comparison to peacekeeping in the previous round of the sequence, 
increase the likelihood to raise the escalation of enforcement in the next step, leading 
to a more substantive mission being implemented. In substantive terms, a diplomatic 
mission in t-1 is associated with a probability of around 90 percent of having a more 
costly mission in the next round (i.e., a technocratic, development, or peacekeeping 
mission). For technocratic missions, this probability is at around 43 percent (i.e., to see 
a development or peacekeeping intervention), while we estimate a 9 percent chance to 
see an even more costly or escalating mission (i.e., peacekeeping) in the next round 
when having a political-development mission in the current round of the sequence. 
Conversely, the likelihood estimates for actually staying at the same escalation level 
for a mission in t+1 are almost all insignificant, while our calculations highlight that 
moving down on the “escalation ladder” for any mission is associated with negative 
statistically significant probability estimates: -40 percent for diplomatic missions, -36 
percent for technocratic missions, and -21 percent for political-development 
interventions. 
To shed more light on mission implementation in light of the previous round’s 
initiative, consider the multinomial logit model (Table 9) with Figure 3 plotting 
predicted probabilities for the mission in the current round given a particular type of 
 
15 Our results are qualitatively similar when grouping all political missions and comparing them to 
peacekeeping operations, i.e., most importantly that political missions are more likely to be implemented 
when conflict has not escalated, and longer peace durations have passed. Also, leaving out the controls 
in Table 7 produces qualitatively similar results. 
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initiative in the previous one.16 In general, our argument for an escalatory logic holds 
and it now becomes clear that this is driven by specific missions. Specifically, 
diplomatic missions do not seem to be primarily responsible for initiating escalation, as 
the coefficient estimates of Diplomatict-1 in Table 8 are all statistically insignificant. 
However, technocratic missions are more likely to see follow-up missions at either the 
same or more costly level. Political-development missions are also positively linked to 
technocratic missions in the next round, which is an instance of de-escalation. 
 
Table 9. The Determinants of UN Missions – Sequencing 
 Diplomatic Technocratic Political-Development 
Diplomatict-1 -1.289 0.226 -0.012 
 (0.995) (0.778) (0.865) 
Technocratict-1 0.972 1.616*** 1.498*** 
 (0.645) (0.568) (0.565) 
Political-developmentt-1 0.953 1.294** 2.893*** 
 (0.808) (0.584) (0.544) 
Peace Duration 0.084* -0.012 0.062 
 (0.049) (0.038) (0.045) 
War Dummy 3.006* 0.133 2.713 
 (1.662) (1.155) (1.765) 
GDP per capita (ln) 0.211 0.099 0.001 
 (0.203) (0.192) (0.243) 
Population (ln) 0.093 -0.268 -0.575*** 
 (0.181) (0.178) (0.195) 
Democracy 0.047 -0.044 0.063 
 (0.050) (0.046) (0.058) 
Peacekeeping Count -0.273*** -0.166*** -0.111 
 (0.063) (0.059) (0.071) 
Obs.   229 
Log Pseudolikelihood   -231.365 
Wald χ2   126.30 
Prob > χ2   0.000 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on conflict in parentheses; peacekeeping 
mission is baseline category; constant included, but omitted from presentation; * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Figure 3 plots predicted probabilities for each mission type (i.e., the categories of 
our outcome variable for the multinomial regression analysis) given a certain type of 
 
16 This approach aligns with Owsiak (2014; 2015) who argues that a prior conflict management approach 
is the most likely to shape subsequent efforts.    
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mission in the previous round. Starting with the plot in the upper left-hand corner, i.e., 
the probability of a diplomatic mission, we see relatively low probabilities, some of 
which are even insignificant. Diplomatic missions are often the starting point for UN 
action, and consistent with our argument when having a technocratic, political-
development, or peacekeeping mission in the previous round, the chances of moving 
down on the “escalation ladder” is low. As shown by the upper right-hand plot, 
technocratic missions are primarily a function of technocratic or diplomatic missions in 
the previous round. The probability estimates when having seen either a political-
development or a peacekeeping mission in t-1 are less strongly pronounced. A similar 
picture emerges when studying the lower left-hand corner, which pertains to the 
probabilities of seeing a political-development initiative. The lowest probability 
estimate is given for peacekeeping in the previous round, standing at around 13 percent. 
Hence, de-escalation from peacekeeping to a political development mission is rare. 
Having had a diplomatic, technocratic, or political-development mission before is more 
strongly associated with a political-development mission in the next phase. Finally, the 
lower right-hand corner shows that peacekeeping is driven by previous peacekeeping 
or diplomatic missions, which is also in line with our escalatory logic. Technocratic or 
political-development missions in the previous round are only weakly linked to 
peacekeeping in the next round. This is an interesting finding and suggests that a 
common escalatory trajectory is for peacekeeping to follow a prior diplomatic 
intervention – rather than other forms of political mission.  
The control variables are generally insignificant, except for the peacekeeping-count 
item: more peacekeeping missions worldwide are more likely to lead to yet another 






























































































































































































in fact, diplomatic and technocratic missions are associated with negative probability 
estimates when having established more peacekeeping missions already. 
 















Notes:  Point estimates are probabilities of seeing a specific mission when having a particular mission in 
the previous round (horizontal axis) while holding all other variables constant at their median; dashed 




Increasingly detailed data and sophisticated analyses have provided us with a better 
understanding of the determinants of peacekeeping. However, much less attention has 
been paid to political missions. The risk is that peacekeeping is compared to a broad 
and relatively poorly understood reference category of “no peacekeeping.” Here, our 
main contribution is to add to unpacking the baseline by considering political missions 
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as distinct instruments of UN peacemaking. Analyzing the UN Peace Initiatives (UNPI) 
data set on political missions, we find strong support for treating them both as separate 
from peacekeeping missions and as “non-interventions.”  
Peacekeeping missions are not always a feasible, or even most appropriate, response 
to situations that may threaten international peace and security. Over time, the UN has 
developed and extended different options enabling it to engage with a variety of 
conflictive situations. We categorized such political missions as diplomatic, 
technocratic, and political-development. It follows that rather than a binary choice 
between peacekeeping and doing nothing, the UN has to decide between a variety of 
options and the question of which factors determine the choice for a particular type of 
mission becomes pertinent. 
Arguably, different types of political missions impose distinct costs on the UN 
system as well as on countries contributing to supplying or hosting missions. Whether 
it is appropriate to accept these costs depends on the potential benefits of a mission 
relative to contextual needs. Not intervening at all may well turn out to be the costliest 
option. That said, after considering the costs of authorization, funding and supply, and 
belligerent consent, peacekeeping stands out in being more expensive than political 
initiatives. Given budgetary and political constraints, we expect the UN and hosting 
states to minimize intervention costs. Put simply, peacekeepers will only be deployed 
when such costly intervention are required. We empirically assessed the impact of 
different conflict characteristics on the onset of different mission types and found that 
political missions are more likely to occur than peacekeeping missions when a conflict 
has not (yet) escalated and more time has passed since the last fighting. Our results 
further suggest the UN is more likely to opt for a peacekeeping mission in conflicts that 
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are “new.” It is plausible that such conflicts indeed present a larger risk to international 
peace and security and need to be addressed urgently. 
Political missions are not only generally less costly than peacekeeping missions, but 
there is also variation in the likely costs of diplomatic, technocratic, and political-
development missions. Considering the relative costs of different political missions, 
political-development missions are more costly than technocratic and diplomatic 
missions, respectively. Political-development missions are usually field missions, while 
diplomatic and technocratic missions face lower barriers for authorization. 17  Our 
analyses do not necessarily support such conjectures. The impact of key conflict 
characteristics does not vary a lot on various political missions. Control variables, such 
as population size and wealth, affect the choice for political mission differently, but not 
in a way that seems related to their relative costs. At the same time, we find evidence 
for the escalatory logic underlying political missions. Less costly missions tend to set 
the framework and requirements for costlier efforts in the future. 
Future work might then seek to explore the wider range of factors that lead to the 
adoption of one form of political mission over another. So far, we have been primarily 
interested in the onset of missions – not incidence, duration, or the termination 
(withdrawal) of initiatives. While these are interesting research questions on their own, 
and they mirror the agenda on, e.g., civil conflict over the past two decades (i.e., civil 
conflict onset, duration, and termination), addressing them goes beyond what we can 
cover here. Third, employing social network analysis (see Böhmelt, 2009) or sequence 
analysis (e.g., Blanchard & Fillieule, 2011) for the UNPI data may be an effort worth 
making, potentially allowing us to uncover interdependencies across missions that we 
 
17 As indicated, the Secretary General can initiate diplomatic missions, where a majority in the General 
Assembly suffices for the authorization of technocratic missions. 
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may not even have anticipated. Finally, while a growing body of research has 
convincingly showed the effectiveness of peacekeeping in managing civil violence 
(Fortna, 2008; Hultman, Kathman & Shannon, 2013, 2014; Ruggeri, Dorussen & 
Gizelis, 2017), it remains unclear if and in what ways political missions are effective 
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This supporting information provides a set of additional analyses and robustness checks 
that further support our argument and findings of the main article. The table of contents 
for these is: 
 
A.1. Testing the Assumptions of the Multinomial Logit   
 
A.2. First Hypothesis Testing: Main Model without Controls    
 
A.3. Controlling for the Number and Type of Previous Missions  
 





A.1: Testing the Assumptions of the Multinomial Logit Regression Model  
 
The multinomial logit model is based on the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) 
assumption. As Cheng and Long (2007) summarize, IIA assumes that adding or omitting of 
(additional) outcome categories does not affect the relative odds associated with the predictors 
in the other, remaining categories. On substantive grounds, this means that, for example, when 
the UN has to choose between a peacekeeping and a technocratic mission, the odds of choosing 
the former over the latter should not depend on whether a third alternative, e.g., a diplomatic 
mission, is present or absent. While there are reasons to argue theoretically for or against the 
validity of the IIA assumption in our setup, we examined it more systematically via the 
Hausman and McFadden (1984) test and the Small-Hsiao (1985) test. Both tests have the null 
hypothesis of “odds (outcome-j vs. outcome-k) are independent of other alternatives,” which 
implies that significant test statistics would suggest that the IIA is violated. We conducted both 
tests for the full model of the main text, i.e., when including peacekeeping operations. Table 
A.1 presents the results. 
However, the test statistics do not provide evidence that the assumption is violated. In 
addition, we also manually omitted one category after another and re-estimated the model again 
to see whether the coefficients substantially differ across estimations. As this is not the case, 
and since neither Wald nor likelihood-ratio tests suggest that we should combine any of the 
alternatives, we have no reason the question the validity of the IIA assumption in our context. 
The same conclusion applies to the setup pertaining to H2 in the main text. 
 




Diplomatic Mission 9.290 14.831 
 (0.901) (0.537) 
Technocratic Mission 7.376 19.737 
 (0.965) (0.232) 
Development Mission 12.257 13.631 
 (0.726) (0.626) 
Peacekeeping Mission 6.490 16.458 
 (0.982) (0.421) 
 
Notes. Table entries are χ2 values; p-values in parentheses. 
 
A.2: First Hypothesis Testing: Main Model without Controls 
 
We re-estimated our main model for H1 while omitting all control variables. Clarke (2005) 
argues against the inclusion of control covariates under some circumstances as – instead of 
lowering the bias in coefficient estimates – they actually may be more likely to lead to wrong 
results. Table A.2 shows, though, that the inclusion or exclusion of our results does not alter 
the substance of our main finding pertaining to Conflict Link. The result for Peace Duration 
also remains mainly robust, although development missions do not seem to differ much from 
peacekeeping operations any longer. Finally, War Dummy is statistically insignificant 






Table A.2. Without Controls 
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 Diplomatic Technocratic Development 
Conflict Link -2.314** -2.983*** -2.188*** 
 (0.922) (0.715) (0.708) 
Peace Duration 0.040** 0.019 0.017 
 (0.019) (0.018) (0.021) 
War Dummy 0.637 0.034 -0.097 
 (0.487) (0.385) (0.353) 
Constant 1.009 2.995*** 1.877*** 
 (0.814) (0.700) (0.660) 
Obs.   352 
Log Pseudolikelihood   -441.482 
Wald χ2   26.03 
Prob > χ2   0.002 
 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping 
mission is baseline category. 
 




Table A.3. Controlling for the Number of Previous Missions 
 
 Diplomatic Technocratic Development 
Conflict Link -0.958 -2.945*** -2.448*** 
 (0.753) (0.857) (0.714) 
Peace Duration 0.032* 0.020 0.020 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
War Dummy 0.269 0.065 0.019 
 (0.477) (0.428) (0.380) 
Missions Count 0.015** 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.007) (0.010) (0.011) 
Constant -0.074 2.925*** 2.047*** 
 (0.606) (0.730) (0.668) 
Obs.   352 
Log Pseudolikelihood   -439.449 
Wald χ2   55.31 
Prob > χ2   0.000 
 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping 
mission is baseline category; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
A.3: Controlling for the Number and Type of Previous Missions  
 
The UN does not always end a mission before starting a new one. Missions can run 
simultaneously. This kind of interdependence is not fully acknowledged in the main text and, 
thus, we modified the main models as follows. First, we now control for the number of missions 
that have been active until point t. Second, we also control for the type of earlier missions. To 
this end, Table A.3 is a modified version of Table 5 in the main text, but we exclude controls 
(for simplicity, see also the robustness check above demonstrating that our results are not 
influenced by the inclusion or exclusion of the confounding factors) and add a variable counting 
the number of previous missions in a country (regardless of its type). Table A.4 is similar, but 
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instead of one count variable, we consider four – one for each type of political mission or 
peacekeeping. 
 
Table A.4. Controlling for the Type of Previous Missions 
 
 Diplomatic Technocratic Development 
Conflict Link -1.745** -2.015** 0.692 
 (0.718) (0.825) (1.704) 
Peace Duration 0.026 0.023 0.026 
 (0.021) (0.023) (0.023) 
War Dummy 0.763* 0.662 0.532 
 (0.409) (0.447) (0.524) 
Diplomatic Count 0.561*** 0.186 -0.218 
 (0.194) (0.147) (0.325) 
Technocratic Count -0.031 0.032 -0.099** 
 (0.042) (0.038) (0.048) 
Political-Development Count 0.040 -0.114 0.824*** 
 (0.223) (0.213) (0.218) 
Peacekeeping Count -0.722*** -0.591*** -0.586*** 
 (0.240) (0.166) (0.178) 
Constant 1.013 2.208*** 1.261 
 (0.644) (0.777) (1.687) 
Obs.   352 
Log Pseudolikelihood   -387.855 
Wald χ2   140.26 
Prob > χ2   0.000 
 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping 
mission is baseline category; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Several interesting findings emerge from these two tables. First, our results remain largely 
robust, supporting the notion that the more difficult cases are likely to attract costlier missions. 
Second, the model fit greatly improves by not only taking into account the number of previous 
missions, but also their type (Table A.4). Third, it is particularly then Table A.4 that points to 
some interesting, and previously unknown, path dependencies and interlinkages between 
missions: while a specific type of mission in the past generally increases the likelihood of that 
mission type in the future (e.g., previous diplomatic missions are positively related to 
diplomatic missions now), the same does not apply with different types of initiatives. In fact, 
the variable Peacekeeping Count is even negatively signed throughout Table A.4. Part of this 
is in line with our escalatory logic, but a more detailed analysis of Table 8 of the main text is 
necessary. Table A.5 provides this: the analysis summarized here is a replication of Table 8 of 
the main text, but we now include missions counts or the disaggregated mission-count items. 
As shown in Table A.5, however, our main results remain robust (positive and significant 
effects of the mission dummies with respect to peacekeeping as the baseline), while there is 
some evidence for mission interdependencies. 
 
 
Table A.5. The Escalatory Logic of UN Missions –  
Controlling for the Number and Type of Previous Missions 
 
 UN Mission First Difference 
UN Mission First 
Difference 
Diplomatict-1 5.676*** 6.805*** 
 (0.855) (0.832) 
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Technocratict-1 2.668*** 3.217*** 
 (0.377) (0.450) 
Political-Developmentt-1 0.812*** 0.988** 
 (0.317) (0.419) 
Peace Duration  0.015  0.014 
 (0.020) (0.019) 
War Dummy 1.316**  0.932 
 (0.659) (0.758) 
Missions Count  0.010  
 (0.021)  
Diplomatic Count  -0.769** 
  (0.304) 
Technocratic Count  -0.061 
  (0.058) 
Political-Development Count  0.017 
  (0.071) 
Peacekeeping Count  0.155*** 
  (0.038) 
Obs. 324 324 
Log Pseudolikelihood -258.667 -241.412 
Wald χ2 75.27 108.35 
Prob > χ2 0.000 0.000 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
A.4: Authorizing Bodies  
 
Decisions to authorize political missions could come from a number of sources, which might 
be made simultaneously with the decision to, e.g., authorize a peacekeeping mission. There is 
not a single UN actor making decisions, but rather the missions arise from different authorizing 
bodies. To account for this influence, we modified Tables 5 and 8 of the main text by omitting 
the controls while adding a variable capturing a mission’s authorizing body. Here, we 
distinguish between the General Assembly (reference category), the Security Council, the 
Secretary General, and a General Assembly Subsidiary Body. Tables A.6 and A.7 summarize 
the findings of these modified models. First, our results pertaining to H1 and H2 remain robust: 
in particular, Conflict Link remains negatively signed and significant in Table A.6, while all 
mission dummies in Table A.7 exert a positive influence. However, the authorizing body does 
not necessarily have a significant influence: only when it comes to the “escalation of missions” 
is the Security Council much more involved than the General Assembly; the binary items for 




Table A.6. Controlling for Authorizing Body 
 
 Diplomatic Technocratic Development 
Conflict Link -2.234** -2.669*** -2.001*** 
 (0.951) (0.695) (0.763) 
Peace Duration 0.029* 0.019 0.015 
 (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) 
War Dummy 0.409 0.123 -0.113 
 (0.521) (0.387) (0.327) 
Security Council -0.368 -0.613 -0.480 
 (0.733) (0.490) (0.597) 
 45 
Secretary General 1.702 -0.875 0.505 
 (1.110) (1.334) (0.989) 
General Assembly Subsidiary Body -0.561 1.299 0.856 
 (1.604) (1.317) (1.298) 
Constant 1.307 3.122*** 2.070** 
 (1.014) (0.871) (0.856) 
Obs.   349 
Log Pseudolikelihood   -420.930 
Wald χ2   66.72 
Prob > χ2   0.000 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; peacekeeping mission 
is baseline category; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
 
Table A.7. The Escalatory Logic of UN Missions –  
Controlling for Authorizing Body 







Peace Duration  0.014 
 (0.020) 
War Dummy  1.183* 
 (0.677) 
Security Council 1.919*** 
 (0.620) 
Secretary General 1.434 
 (1.061) 
General Assembly Subsidiary Body  1.863* 
 (1.003) 
Obs. 321 
Log Pseudolikelihood -250.151 
Wald χ2 88.32 
Prob > χ2 0.000 
Table entries are coefficients; standard errors clustered on country in parentheses; * p < 0.10, 
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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